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Abstract
The purpose of the article is to analyse the implications of 
policy differentiation for EU’s comprehensive approach in 
security matters. The change in the post-Cold War security 
environment (opportunity) favoured the explicitness of 
the (pillarised) security actorness of the European Union. 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the EU adopted an ambitious 
security approach that confirmed four interconnected 
dynamics: expansion of the security agenda, externalisa-
tion of internal security cooperation, internalisation of 
Common Security Defence Policy, and cross-pillarisation. 
It was an upgrade for the assertion of the European Union 
as a comprehensive and multi-functional security actor, 
endowed with autonomy, capability and presence. Since 
then, the EU narrative and practices on Comprehensive 
Approach have been applied to several security problems 
such as crises and conflicts, organised crime, piracy, cyber-
security, failed states, trafficking in human beings, radica-
lisation, hybrid threats. The comprehensive approach 
combined with a global (reach) ambition impose unique 
requirements on EU. A major challenge to EU’s security 
actorness is policy differentiation in the security domain. 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
acquired legal personality, enabling it to conclude treaties 
and to assume external representation. This also means 
that, for the first time, external and internal security poli-
cies evolve in the framework of an International Organisa-
tion. The Treaty also overcame pillarisation, transferred 
the cooperation on internal security to the TFEU, introdu-
ced amendments in the continued search for the Union’s 
external coherence and demonstrated the dynamism of 
the policies of the former second and third pillars. Howe-
ver, the adjustments that were introduced denote a cons-
tructive ambiguity, patent in the existence of provisions 
enabling a comprehensive action, on the one hand, and of 
a hidden pillarisation, on the other hand, aggravated by 
the absence of an explicit concern with the coherence 
between the external and internal dimensions of security 
(‘the missing link’). 
Resumo
A Actorness Securitária da União Europeia: A Abordagem 
Holística Comprometida pela Diferenciação Política
O artigo tem por objetivo analisar as implicações da policy dif-
ferentiation para a comprehensive approach (CA) da União 
Europeia no domínio da segurança. O ambiente do pós-Guerra 
Fria (oportunidade) favoreceu a explicitação da actorness de 
segurança da UE. Após os ataques terroristas de 11 de Setembro 
de 2001, a União adotou uma abordagem ambiciosa demonstra-
tiva de quatro dinâmicas interconectadas: expansão da agenda de 
segurança; externalização da cooperação no domínio da segu-
rança interna; internalização da Política Comum de Segurança e 
Defesa; transpilarização. Tal representou um avanço em benefí-
cio da afirmação da UE como ator de segurança holístico e mul-
tifuncional, dotado de autonomia, capacidade e presença. Desde 
então, a narrativa e as práticas europeias generalizam-se a diver-
sos problemas de segurança tais como crises e conflitos, crime 
organizado, pirataria, cibersegurança, Estados Falhados, tráfico 
de seres humanos, radicalização, ameaças híbridas. Esta abord-
agem associada a uma ambição de actorness global impõem 
exigências únicas à UE. Um dos principais desafios decorre da 
policy differentiation na área da segurança. Com a entrada em 
vigor das alterações introduzidas pelo Tratado de Lisboa, a UE 
passou a estar dotada de personalidade jurídica, o que lhe per-
mite celebrar tratados internacionais e ter representação externa. 
Tal significa que, pela primeira vez na história da construção 
europeia, a cooperação no domínio da segurança (interna e 
externa) desenvolve-se no âmbito de uma Organização Internac-
ional. O Tratado de Lisboa também superou a estrutura em 
pilares, introduziu alterações com vista a reforçar a coerência da 
atuação externa do ator europeu e comprovou o dinamismo coop-
erativo no âmbito das políticas dos antigos segundo e terceiros 
pilares. No entanto, os ajustamentos consagrados pelo Tratado 
Reformador evidenciam uma ambiguidade construtiva patente 
nas disposições que favorecem uma ação holística, por um lado, e 
na pilarização encoberta, por outro, agravada pela ausência de 
uma preocupação explícita com a coerência entre as dimensões 
interna e externa da segurança (the missing link). 
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The Monnet Project is a response to a Westphalian security concern (inter-state con-
flict) resorting to post-Westphalian non-security means: supranational, incremental 
institutionalism. The European integration process has operated a ‘silent revolu-
tion’ in International Relations and has shown its dynamism in three essential 
aspects: deepening, enlarging and building a post-Westphalian polity. The internal 
dynamics facilitated, sometimes even enhanced, by the international environment, 
favoured the emergence of the economic actor (in a first phase), of the international 
actor and, after the Cold War, of the security actor (ongoing process).
In a context in which the community discourse has been fertile in identifying Europe’s 
challenges in a globalised world1, amongst which we find the post-Westphalian secu-
rity challenges, it is paramount to reflect upon the contribution of EU comprehensive 
approach to the security governance of the European Union. The Union has been 
innovative in creating a de facto security community that overcame the European 
interstate conflict, and since the end of the Cold War it endeavoured to address the 
multi-sector and transnational threats of a complex security environment:
“The threats facing Europe, no longer exclusively ‘hard’, but rather often ‘soft’, no 
longer respect the geopolitical borders of the nation-state and the EU. More impor-
tantly still, they traverse and resist the institutional ‘borders’ and arrangements tradi-
tionally designed to manage them (social agencies, informational authorities, police, 
etc.). The most significant effect of this shift is that the lives of citizens are no longer 
regulated at the physical borders. The border operations traditionally provided for by 
the nation-state (border controls and security guards, passport authorities, etc.) have 
in this way shifted outwards. At the same time, a growing number of European and 
1 See for instance: “Lecture by Javier Solana, Secretary General/High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the Inauguration of the Diplomatic Academy of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, on ‘Global Challenges for the European 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Warsaw, 16 October 2002; “Press Conference at 
EU Informal Summit Hampton Court”, 27 October 2005; European Commission, “Communi-
cation from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006 – Europe in the World – 
Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility” (COM/2006/278), 
Brussels, 2006; “Speech by Javier Solana EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy ‘Europe’s Answers to the Global Challenges” at the University of Copenhagen, 
8 September 2006”, Copenhagen, 2006; “Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of 
the Signature of the Treaties of Rome”, Berlin, 25 March 2007; Commission of the European 
Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions: The 
European Interest: Succeeding in the Age of Globalisation: Contribution of the Commission to 
the October Meeting of Heads of State and Government” (COM/2007/581), Brussels, 2007; 
“Comunicado de Imprensa da Presidência sobre o Conselho Europeu Informal [de Lisboa]”, 
Lisboa, 19 de Outubro de 2007; Foreign Commonwealth Office, “Global Europe: Meeting the 
Economic and Security Challenges”, 2007; “EU Declaration on Globalisation” (annex), “Brus-
sels European Council – 13/14 December 2007 – Presidency Conclusions”, Brussels, 2007.
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international organizations have taken on increasingly dominant roles entirely 
detached from nation-state sovereignty, further contributing to the interrelatedness of 
non-national institutions and regions, and further weakening both the role and capac-
ity of traditional sovereignty arrangements.” (Burguess, 2009, p. 315)2.
The widespread use of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ (CA)3 in EU security narra-
tive and practices raises several questionings about the what (is the CA), the why, 
the how (to implement it), and the ‘with what effects’. Considering that the main 
challenge to this ambitious approach (of an actor in-making without exclusive 
powers in the sensitive domain of security) is the ‘how’, this Article focus on policy 
differentiation as a constraint to EU Comprehensive Approach. In this line of 
thought, the main research question is formulated as follows: How the Lisbon 
Treaty contributed to the CA in security matters? The main argument is that the 
Lisbon Treaty legally enshrined the comprehensive approach of the actor, in line 
with the previous cross-pillar tendency catalysed by the 9/11 events and by the 
nature of the main challenges to European security. The amendments introduced 
by the Treaty show, however, a constructive ambiguity patent in the coexistence of 
provisions enabling a comprehensive action in the security domain, on the one 
hand, and of a hidden pillarisation based in policy differentiation applied to inter-
nal and external security, on the other hand. 
The Article begins by framing the research on EU’s security policy. The second sec-
tion traces the path of EU security actorness towards a comprehensive approach. 
The third section focus on the changes inserted by Lisbon Treaty with relevance to 
2 “The world faces traditional and non-traditional security fears. Many of our countries are tar-
gets of terrorism, which eight years on from September 11, 2001, we must recognize is down, 
but by no means out. There are fragile states to contend with as well as the dangers of the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction, authoritarian regimes, and the threat of extremism. 
Globalization has also thrown up non-traditional security challenges with no respect for 
national frontiers. Global pandemics can spread faster; a lack of secure and sustainable energy 
could push us into a world-wide recession; and climate change, beyond its environmental con-
sequences, could have serious geopolitical and social repercussions." (Barroso, 2009). 
3 This is part of a general international trend. The same expression (or similar expressions) are 
being used by Governments (‘Whole-of-government approach’, UK and US; ‘3D’, Canada and 
Netherlands) and IOs (‘integrated approach’, UN; ‘Comprehensive Approach’, NATO; ‘Com-
prehensive Approach’, African Union and OSCE; ‘WGA’, OECD). The same or near-by expres-
sions share the same rationale – coherence (through coordination) across different policies and 
actors –, but they are applied to different areas depending on the actor (e.g., UN – peacebuild-
ing; NATO – civil-military). Coning (2008, p. 7) distinguishes four elements of coherence in the 
Comprehensive Approach: agency coherence; whole-of-government coherence; external 
coherence; external/internal coherence. Coning and Friis (2011) elaborated a matrix to analyse 
those forms of coherence based on six categories – (‘actor's’) union, integration, cooperation, 
coordination, coexistence, competition.
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security actorness. The final one analyses the policy differentiation in the security 
domain.
Towards a Holistic Perspective on EU Security Actorness 
In the first phase of definition, the European security actor followed the state model, 
based on the separation between external security and internal security, reinforced 
by the pillars structure. This is the reason why the research followed specific non-
communicating agendas, but the prevailing trend was the analysis of the issue of 
‘European security’ within the framework of the second pillar. Accordingly, the 
subject of European security actorness acquired relevance following the creation of 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Vasconcelos, 2009). The imple-
mentation of operations on the ground has contributed to the visibility and subse-
quent recognition of the security actorness by external actors, inheritors of the real-
ist legacy which values the military component and the classic distinction between 
the external and internal dimensions.
The research on EU ‘internal security’4, in the broader framework of cooperation in 
the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) field, developed autonomously, mostly using 
the contributions from criminal and legal sciences:
“For a long time literature dealing with security issues in the context of European 
integration tended to focus only on traditional external and particularly military 
security issues. Yet during the 1990s internal security started to occupy increasingly 
prominent place on the agenda of the European Union.” (Mitsilegas, Monar and Rees, 
2003, p. 1)
4 The cooperation in internal security has developed in the broad domain of Justice and Home 
Affairs/Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Until the Lisbon Treaty the most common ter-
minology was ‘Police Cooperation and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’. The designa-
tion of [EU] ‘internal security’ was consolidated by the Lisbon Treaty. For the first time in the 
TEU the terminology ‘national security’ appears unexpectedly associated to internal security, 
leaving the reader with a methodical doubt concerning the conceptual difference (not clarified 
by the legislator) between both. In previous Treaties, ‘internal security’ referred to the Member 
States internal security. The setting up of the COSI deepened the collective dimension of ‘inter-
nal security’ in the common area. The explanation for the terminological diversification is pre-
sented in a report by the British Parliament: “On 12 July 2007 Mr. Murphy gave oral evidence 
to this Committee on the June 2007 European Council. Discussing the distinction between 
national security and internal security, he said that the latter phrase was previously in common 
use but was in his view open to misunderstanding, since it had come to describe “two different 
but not mutually exclusive things. Internal security was the internal security within Member 
States but also internal security within the European Union, and we wished to move away 
from the possibility of misunderstanding, which is why we have now moved towards the 
description of national security, and the fact that it is for the first time explicit in the terms of 
this Treaty.” (United Kingdom, 2008b, p. 158). In rigour, the EU cooperation in this field reports 
to ‘transnational security’.
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Furthermore, one should note that the first pillar had also concurred to the building 
of the security actor, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention and peace-
building. Considering the initially economic bias of the international organisation 
(EEC), which began by asserting itself in the realms of trade policy, development 
cooperation policy and humanitarian aid, it is only natural that it easily incorpo-
rated the nexus peace-development/poverty-conflict and thus favoured action 
over the root causes of conflicts5. This connection, which is also reflected on the intro-
duction of the security component in the agreements with developing countries, 
enabled inter-pillars coordination, namely between the first and second ones. 
Within the framework of the development policy revision started in 1995, the EU 
included conflict prevention in the development policy, initially associated with 
Africa6, with a focus on conflict analysis, early warning and early action. 
The cross-pillar approach adopted in the fight against transnational terrorism asso-
ciated to the increase in the civilian dimension of the ESDP, required an inter-pillar 
coordination and a rising role for the Commission in the field of security (lato sensu). 
These developments have induced the theorisation of the European Union as a 
comprehensive and multidimensional actor, in which EU Security Governance by 
Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (2007) is framed. The authors organise the EU’s 
response into four categories that cover the three former pillars: prevention (inter/
intra-state conflict prevention through the building of democratic institutions and 
the consolidation of civil society), assurance (peace-building), protection (internal 
security), compellence (implementation of the CSDP through peace-making, peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement autonomous missions). Gradually, the Union con-
stituted itself as “the facilitator of joint action”, defined “its role as an autonomous 
security actor” and legitimised “its partial displacement of the state” (Kirschner 
and Sterling, 2007, p. 122).
The present analysis applies a combined theoretical framework. The above men-
tioned Kirschner and Sterling’s security governance theorisation is articulated with 
the conceptual elements of actorness conceived by Bretenthorn and Vogler (2007) to 
5 See for instance “European Commission Checklist for Root-causes of Conflict/Early Warning 
Indicators” [online], available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/conflict_ 
prevention/docs/cp_guide_en.pdf.
6 See Council of the European Union, 1995. Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peace-
keeping in Africa; Commission of the European Communities, 1996. The EU and the Issue of Con-
flict in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond; Council of the European Union, 
1998. The Tool of Development Co-operation in Strengthening Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution; Commission of the ECs, 2001. Communication from the Commission on Conflict Preven-
tion (COM/2001/211); Council Conclusions on Security and Development, 2007. More recently, 
the comprehensive regional strategies also focused on Africa: Sahel (2011), Horn of Africa 
(2011), Great Lakes (2013) and Gulf of Guinea (2014).
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EU international dimension: presence – “ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, 
to exert influence externally, to shape perceptions, expectations and behaviour of 
others”; opportunity – “factors in the external environment of ideas and events that 
constrain or enable actorness”; capability – “the availability of policy instruments 
and understandings about the Union’s ability to utilize these instruments, in 
response to opportunity and/ or to capitalize on presence”. Concerning the latter 
criteria, a specification in called: institutional capacity (autonomous institutions 
and specialized bodies, and institutional processes, including decision-making pro-
cesses within the IO); policy capacity (agenda-setting, adoption, implementation 
and monitoring of policies); legal capacity (legal personality and capacity to adopt 
legal instruments); resources (human, material and financial resources). This article 
addresses one of the elements of the mentioned criteria: policy capacity7.
The Evolving Security Actorness: From Pillarization to Comprehensive Approach
The economic specialisation of the European international organisation and the 
debacle of the European Defence Community Project, associated to the nature of 
the threat and the guarantee of the security needs by the USA and NATO during the 
Cold War, postponed the inclusion of the security agenda. Although the clarifica-
tion of the security actor (and subsequent theorisation) only materialises in the 
post-Cold War, one can say that the problematic issue of security is ubiquitous in 
the European integration process.
Underlying the creation of the ECSC, there was a classic reactive security concern 
against a globalised European war and one preventive of a new inter-state conflict. 
The Monnet project built upon an institutionalised and gradual strategy aimed at 
guaranteeing the Franco-German peace (and thus European peace) through the 
integration of the coal and steel sectors in a post-Westphalian organisation. “Euro-
pean integration has always involved the use of economic cooperation to reduce 
political conflicts among EU Member States” (Smith, 2004, p. 7).
Countering the (realism) scepticism concerning the usefulness of the ‘community’ 
concept in the world of power politics, national interest and anarchy, the European 
Union has proved it possible, even if at a regional scale, to fulfil “[T]he idea that 
actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and 
engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interest, 
diffuse reciprocity, and trust” (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 3). 
7 Regarding the subcriteria of decision-making, the Article addresses only the formal decision-
making procedures. According to Kaunert and Léonard (2012, p. 426), “it is not sufficient to only 
observe the formal decision-making rules in order to determine whether an area of security 
policy is governed intergovernmentally or supranationally, or by a mixture of both”. But the fact 
is that the binding decisions are adopted through those procedures, whether ordinary or special. 
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Countering centuries of inter-state conflict, the European states have built a commu-
nity in which there is “a real assurance that the members of that community will not 
fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way” (Karl 
Deutsch, quoted in Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 6). Set on “an institutional and societal 
transnational base” (Ole Waever quoted in Adler and Barnett, 1998, p. 6) and having 
a structural common interest in keeping inter-state peace and security, the relations 
among Member States have been characterised by mutual trust and predictability.
Internal pacification had a spill over effect on the external area. Different policies 
have contributed to international security and stability, especially, on the one hand, 
the enlargement policy that extended the security community to new States and 
supports the transition of candidate States and, on the other hand, the development 
cooperation policy which is based upon the security-development nexus. 
In a first phase, an implicit security actor was built, later evolving to the creation and 
consolidation of an expansive security community that favoured the use of non-secu-
rity means. The end of the Cold War, the implosion of the Soviet Union, the decreased 
American presence in Europe and the expansion of the (widened and deepened) 
security agenda, created the opportunity for the actor’s upgrade to a new stage. The 
weaknesses of its actions in neighbouring intra-state conflict situations (Balkans) and 
the concern with the transnational threats in an internally borderless market cata-
lysed the clarification of the security actor thanks to the introduction of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (second pillar) and the police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters (third pillar)8. This explicitness was reinforced by the Amsterdam 
Treaty with the formalization of the actor’s military (and civilian) component (ESDP) 
in the second pillar’s framework, the specialisation of the third pillar and the exter-
nalisation of ‘internal security’ also within this pillar’s framework. 
The trace towards a comprehensive approach is connected with EU international 
actorness, more specifically with the imperative of coherence (horizontal policy and 
institutional coordination at European level) and consistency (vertical coordination 
between the European and Member States levels) in EU international presence. In 
the security domain, early initiatives regarding the fight against organised crime, a 
security challenge prioritized by the creation of an European internal market, 
required interpillars (3rd and 1st pillars) coordination9; the improved role of the Union 
in conflict prevention demanded interpillars (2nd and 1st pillars) coordination10. 
8 In the Maastricht Treaty, the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) concerned also cooperation 
in the fields of immigration and asylum. 
9 See recommendation 6 of the Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime (Adopted by the Coun-
cil on 28 April 1997) regarding the fight against corruption.
10 For the prevention of conflicts, peacebuilding and structural stability contributed several poli-
cies domains from the 1st (trade, finance, development, environmental policies) and 2nd pillars 
(CFSP/ESDP).
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The upgrade from interpillarisation to cross-pillarisation came from the need to 
fight the complex threat of terrorism after the 9/11. The materialization of the 
threat, firstly in the US and then in EU Member States, inaugurated a new stage in 
the actor’s construction, tempering the fragmented pillarisation: “The European 
Union will intensify its commitment against terrorism through a coordinated and 
inter-disciplinary approach that will incorporate all of the Union’s policies” (Euro-
pean Council, 2001, p. 1). Although the focus of the European fight was placed on 
the police and judicial instruments, the complexity of the threat justified a cross-
pillar approach underlined by the four axis – prevention, protection, pursuit, 
response – of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Council of the EU, 2005). The coordi-
nation between the pillars concerning security previously required both by conflict 
prevention (1995) and by the externalisation of cooperation in the ‘internal security’ 
realm (1999), reached a new level by contemplating the three pillars simultaneously 
– cross-pillar coordination. In 2004, the ‘Conceptual Framework’ (European Coun-
cil, 2004) countered the European legacy to fight terrorism with judicial and police 
instruments, and declared for the first time the possibility of using ESDP including 
internally (internalization of an external policy). 
Since this period, the EU narrative and practices on Comprehensive Approach 
have been applied to several security problems such as crises and conflicts11 12 (from 
prevention to peabuilding), organised crime13, piracy14, cybersecurity15, failed sta- 
11 “The ideas and principles governing the comprehensive approach have yet to become, systemati-
cally, the guiding principles for EU external action across all areas, in particular in relation to 
conflict prevention and crisis resolution” (High Representative and European Commission, 2013).
12 See annex 4 (“Overview of How Different Instruments can be Combined to Provide a Compre-
hensive Package of Crisis Assistance”) of “Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management” 
(European Commission, April 2003).
13 “The high level of safety in the area of freedom, security and justice presupposes an efficient 
and comprehensive approach in the fight against all forms of crime” (The Prevention and Con-
trol of Organised Crime: a European Union Strategy for the Beginning of the New Millennium, 
2000, [online], available at http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f3b0c604-969c-
4234-86d8-0213e3baa4a4.0006.02/DOC_1.
14 “While bearing all aspects of organised crime, piracy is a complex issue that can only be over-
come by combining political and diplomatic efforts with military and legal action, development 
assistance and strong international coordination. With all these tools at its disposal, the European 
Union (EU) is in a unique position to contribute to international efforts, and addresses that chal-
lenge through a ‘comprehensive approach’ tackling both current symptoms and root causes of 
the problem.” [online], available at http://eeas.europa.eu/piracy/index_en.htm). “Addressing 
the adverse effects of piracy through the range of relevant instruments and of other forms of 
organised crime (e.g. trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs), of terrorism but also the effects 
of irregular migration – all offshoots of poverty and insecurity in the region.” (Council Conclu-
sions on the Horn of Africa, 3124th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 November 2011).
15 “Due to the potential or actual borderless nature of the risks, an effective national response would 
often require EU-level involvement. To address cybersecurity in a comprehensive fashion, activi-
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tes16, trafficking in human beings17, radicalisation18, hybrid threats19. Differently 
from NATO, the EU approach is not restricted to the civil-military coordination, 
and, distinctly from UN, surpasses the security-development nexus. It is a holistic 
perspective to deal with “wicked” security problems, from conflicts and crises to 
cyberthreats, from external to internal and cross-border challenges. 
The first document presenting the EU’s ‘security doctrine’ confirmed this compre-
hensive tendency: a holistic security concept, an interdependence of threats (threats 
dynamics/’threat multiplier’), the security nexuses (security-development; inter-
nal-external security) (Brandão, 2015). The European Security Strategy (European 
Council 2003) corroborated yet another relevant change in the actor’s discourse:
“It stands for a discursive turn in the sense that the very theme of (external) security 
is no longer off-limits to the EU in the way it traditionally used to be. (…)’ Whereas 
the EU previously pertained to security in a rather indirect manner and did so mainly 
through its structural essence by providing a unifying centre rather than appearing 
itself explicitly as a securitizing agent vis-à-vis the external environment, the new 
doctrine seems to be part of efforts that aim at bolstering the Union’s actorness on the 
international scene.” (Joenniemi, 2007, p. 136).
ties should span across three key pillars– NIS, law enforcement, and defence – which also operate 
within different legal frameworks” (Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Cybersecu-
rity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace JOIN/2013/ 1 final).
16 “The European Community (…) will develop a comprehensive approach to state fragility, con-
flict, natural disasters and other types of crises” (Council, Representatives of the Representa-
tives of the Member States European Parliament and Commission, European Consensus on 
Development, 2005)
17 “[EU Anti-trafficking Coordinator] tasks include addressing the urgent need to ensure consis-
tent and coordinated strategic planning at EU level and with international organisations and 
third countries, to address this issue in a comprehensive manner.” (Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of 
Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016 – COM/2012/286 final).
18 “The European Council of 12 February 2015 at which Heads of State and Government called 
for a comprehensive approach, including initiatives regarding social integration, among 
others, which are of great importance to prevent violent radicalisation” (Conclusions of the 
Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within 
the Council, on the role of the youth sector in an integrated and cross-sectoral approach to 
preventing and combating violent radicalisation of young people, 14 June 2016)
19 “A holistic approach that will enable the EU, in coordination with Member States, to specifi-
cally counter threats of a hybrid nature by creating synergies between all relevant instruments 
and fostering close cooperation between all relevant actors” (Joint Communication to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats a European 
Union Response JOIN/2016/018 final).
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In the same line, the first EU Internal Security Strategy (Council of the EU, 2010), 
appealed to a holistic concept of internal security, a comprehensive approach to 
deal with the common threats and the interdependence between the internal and 
external components of security. A posteriori, the first document to clarify the com-
mon understanding of ‘comprehensive approach’ (to external conflicts and crises) 
was only adopted in 2013 followed by an Action Plan in 201520: “Comprehensive-
ness refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, 
but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States” (High 
Representative, 2013, p. 3). The updated strategies and priorities in the security area 
(European Commission, 2015; European Council, 2016) consolidated this compre-
hensive trend21. 
In order to understand the CA (in the security field) in its complete spectrum, it is 
worth considering also ‘the why’. The literature on the issue advances two main 
arguments. The pragmatic argument underlines the need to avoid duplication and 
promote synergies, considering the co-dependency between civil and military 
security (Rintakoski and Autti, 2008). The political argument demonstrates that 
the European Union uses the CA narrative to show its positive uniqueness and dif-
ferentiation as a global security actor (Germond, McEnery and Marchi, 2016; Chap-
pell, Mawdsley and Petrov, 2016). In addition, it should be stressed that the CA 
trend has been favoured by mutually reinforcing contextual, legal and institutional 
factors. The Post-Cold War environment has been characterized by complex multi-
dimensional and cross-border security problems and a broad understanding of 
security in terms of threats, security objects, security providers and instruments 
(multissectorial and multilevel security). This widener/deepener perspective has 
also been nourished by the security nexuses narrative and practices (internal-exter-
20 Council of the EU, 2015. Joint Staff Working Document – Taking forward the EU’s Comprehensive 
Approach to External Conflict and Crises – Action Plan 2015 (7913/15). 
21 “We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy” (High Representative, 
Strategic Review – The European Union in a Changing Global Environment – Executive Summary, 
2015); “The EU response must therefore be comprehensive and based on a coherent set of 
actions combining the internal and external dimensions, to further reinforce links between 
Justice and Home Affairs and Common Security and Defence Policy” (European Commission, 
“The European Security Agenda”, COM/2015/185); “All the dimensions of a Europe that pro-
tects its citizens and offers effective rights to people inside and outside the Union are inter-
linked. Success or failure in one field depends on performance in other fields as well as on 
synergies with related policy areas” (Strategic Guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, in: European Council Conclusions, 26/27 June 2014); “The European Union and its 
Member States can bring to the international stage the unique ability to combine, in a consis-
tent manner, policies and tools ranging from diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, 
development and justice. Further improving the efficiency and effectiveness of this EU Com-
prehensive Approach” (European Council Conclusions, 19/20 December 2013). 
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nal security, civil-military security, development-security, among others). In legal 
terms, the combined use of instruments from different pillars to fight against com-
mon threats and, most significantly, the changes inserted by the Lisbon Treaty (EU 
legal status, the end of the pillars structure, the transference of internal security to 
the TFEU, the High Representative as member of both the Council and Commis-
sion) created the Treaty basis for the CA. Finally, regarding the institutional dimen-
sion, it is manifest the interest of the Commission in promoting the CA also in the 
security domain. In order to reverse an historical absence from this sensitive 
domain, the Commission pushes for the combination of multiple instruments to 
face complex security problems, particularly those from policy areas in which the 
institution has expertise and influence. 
The Lisbon Treaty: Advances and Ambiguities in the Security Domain
Similarly to previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty ensured continuity, formalised 
actual amendments and introduced innovative elements whose scope can only be 
perceived as they are implemented. Reaffirming the objectives of making the Euro-
pean Union institutionally more efficient, closer to the citizen, more efficient and 
coherent in external action, it introduced a goal concerning global challenges (Por-
tugal, 2007). 
In this reforming context, the CSDP and, particularly, the ‘internal security’, stood 
out as the most dynamic areas of the last revision. Before analysing specific changes, 
three transversal changes that also have implications in the security domain should 
be highlighted. 
First, the Lisbon Treaty ended the dual (EC/EU) system in force since 1993 that 
penalized the Union’s action capacity and its external recognition. Endowed with 
unique legal personality22, EU assumes the external representation, and it is capable 
of celebrating treaties and of participating in International Organisations. This 
means that, for the first time, CFSP/CSDP and ‘internal security’ evolve in the 
framework of an International Organisation under International Law. Beyond the 
legal meaning, Solana underlined the political importance of this change that 
facilitates the recognition, visibility and readability of the Union: “it would be eas-
ier for third countries to understand the EU without the complication of dealing 
with, and sometimes signing agreements with, different entities.” (United King-
dom, 2008a, p. 33).
Second, the Treaty overcame, if only on the surface, the Thatcherian pillar matrix, 
coming closer to the tree-like Delors matrix and consecrating de jure the tendency 
initiated by the de facto cross-pillarisation, namely in realms such as external rela-
tions, security and the environment benefiting the actor’s coherence and efficiency. 
22 “The Union shall have legal personality” (Article 47 of the TEU). 
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The policies of the former second and third pillars were brought under the jurisdic-
tion of a single entity; however, we can state that there subsists a disguised pillari-
sation, namely concerning the decision-making, with implications in the realms of 
external action and security. In fact, the CFSP (and the CSDP) maintains a separate 
legal character23 that safeguards its intergovernmental nature. Concerning the 
Commission’s right of initiative, it is restricted to the Union’s High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:
“Through its creation of a new HR (who partly represents the Commission), the Lis-
bon Treaty has elevated the Commission’s voice in CFSP. However, whereas in the 
current EU Treaty, the Commission has the right to submit proposals to the Council 
(current EU treaty, Article 20, paragraph 1) and was “fully associated” with CFSP 
(current EU treaty, Article 18, paragraph 4), under the Lisbon Treaty it will lose this 
right – this now being associated solely with the High Representative” (Daghan, 2008, 
p. 3). 
The CFSP’s specificity also justifies the CSDP exclusion from the scope of Article 
352 of the TFEU (Wessels and Franziska, 2008). Furthermore, it should be noted 
that, contrary to the simplification established by the Constitutional Treaty, the 
above mentioned domains are under the aegis of both treaties. So, concerning the 
security domain, the CFSP and the CSDP remain in the European Union Treaty 
(TEU), whilst the ‘internal security’ was transferred to the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU).
Finally, the creation of the posts of European Council President and High Represen-
tative intends to contribute to the inter-institutional and inter-policies coordination 
in a context of further continuity. The innovative formula associated to the Euro-
pean Union’s institutional complexity and the absence of a clear division of compe-
tence generates “role conflicts between the President of the European Council and 
the High Representative” (Wessels and Bopp, 2008, p. 18). 
 
23 “The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be 
defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, 
except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. 
The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the 
Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is 
defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction 
with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance 
with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by 
the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” 
(Article 24 of the TEU).
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CFSP/CSDP
The inherited concern with the coherence of the international actor justifies the 
text defining the principles and goals of the Union’s external action24 that con-
nects the two treaties (TEU and TFEU). Having safeguarded the intergovernmen-
tal nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, this was the formula that 
was found to promote the unity (principles and objectives) in diversity (of the 
policies).
The main change in the realm of the CFSP was the redefinition of the post of the 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council’s face for 
the CFSP and, simultaneously, Vice-President of the Commission for Foreign 
Relations, who also presides over the Council of Foreign Affairs, conducts the 
foreign policy and the common security policy and represents the Union in the 
international scene in matters pertaining to the CFSP. When an EU common posi-
tion is approved on “a theme that is on the agenda of the United Nations Security 
Council, the Member States that have a seat in it ask that the High Representative 
be invited to present the Union’s position” (Article 34 of the TEU). The High Rep-
resentative is supported by the new diplomatic service – European External 
Action Service (Article 27, nº3 of the TEU)25 – comprising officials from the Coun-
cil, the Commission and the Member States that, by overcoming the old dual 
structure of the first and second pillars, intends to contribute to the EU’s external 
coherence and visibility, countering the parallel and, sometimes, conflicting 
‘diplomacies’ of the Commission and the Council.
Along the lines of previous revisions, the Treaty confirmed the controlled exten-
sion of majority voting in the Council, from now on also applicable to the approval 
of proposals presented by the High Representative (Article 31, nº2 of the TEU) 
with the possibility of extending its use being left open (Article 31, nº3 of the 
TEU).
The constructive ambiguity which has emerged as a tendency of the process of 
European integration, explains some of the opposite readings of the Treaty as well 
as the efforts to tone the opposites:
“They [the CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty] could be interpreted as a major 
step forward in the direction of a strengthened, more coherent and more effective 
international actor with more supranational elements; but they may also be seen as 
demonstrating an ever-refined mode of ‘rationalised intergovernmentalism’. After 
24 See: nº1 and nº2, Article 21 of the TEU (Title V “General provisions on the Union’s external 
action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy”); Article 205 of the 
TEU (Part V “The Union’s external action”, Title I “General provisions on the Union’s external 
action”).
25 See Council of the EU (2009) and Rettman (2010).
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an in-depth analysis of the ideas and norms contained in the new treaty, the insti- 
tutions and the instruments, the authors find more evidence for the second inter- 
pretation, but also traces for a ‘ratched fusion’ as a third alternative explanation.” 
(Wessels and Bopp, 2008)
The ESDP, now designated Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), illus-
trates the above mentioned trilogy: continuity of what is essential, de jure statement 
of de facto situations and controlled innovation. The continuity is patent in the pol-
icy’s intergovernmental nature, as well as, in reaffirming the CSDP as an integral 
part of the CFSP and in the will to build “a common defence policy that may lead 
to a common defence” (Article 24, nº1 of the TEU).
The enlargement of the Petersberg missions advanced by the Thessaloniki Euro-
pean Council, by the Headline Goal 2010 and by the European Security Strategy, 
has a legal base26 and a ‘solidarity clause’ in case of a terrorist attack or a natural or 
human made catastrophe (Article 222 of the TFEU) that stipulates the use of “all the 
instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the 
Member States”. The European Defence Agency, established by the Council in 
200427, is now formally part of the legal Framework of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (Article 42, nº3 and 45 of the TEU).
Three innovative elements deserve a special reference. First, the flexibility of coop-
eration in the defence realm in three different ways or processes: permanent 
structured cooperation28 open to States that fulfil ‘higher criteria’29, aimed at par-
ticipating in the major European equipment programmes, organising multinational 
forces, forwarding combat units available for immediate action; reinforced cooper-
ation among a minimum of nine States; an ad hoc cooperation delegating a specific 
mission on a group of States (Article 42, nº5 and 44 of the TEU) which, according to 
Gerrard Quille (2008, p. 6), could be shaped as a multinational force or as a Battle-
26 Article 43 of the TEU: “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military 
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks 
may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in com-
bating terrorism in their territories”.
27 See Council Regulation (EC) n°2007/2004 of 26 October 2004, establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders.
28 See the nº6 of Article 42 and Article nº46 of the TEU. At the Informal Meeting of the Defense 
Policy Directors (Madrid, 19-20 March) Spanish Presidency presented its goals for defense 
matters and debated issues concerning the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The meet-
ing initiated also the debate about Permanent Structured Cooperation (España, Gobierno, 
2010). 
29 See Protocol (nº10) on Permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty 
on European Union.
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group. At this level it is also possible to find dual effects: on the one hand, condi-
tions have been created to facilitate the development of European cooperation in 
the sensitive realm of defence; on the other hand, the eventual implementation of a 
permanent structured cooperation between the big countries could result in a ‘two-
speed Europe’.
The second novelty is the ‘mutual defence clause’ binding the states to help and 
assist a Member State which has been the target of an armed aggression on its ter-
ritory (Article 42, nº7 of the TEU) This notwithstanding and in consonance with the 
‘civil’ nature of the EU, and unlike NATO’s defence clause, it does not specify the 
resort to the use of armed force. 
Finally, the decision-making process has become more agile through the intro-
duction of qualified majority voting (establishment of a permanent structured 
cooperation) and the funding of missions thanks to the implementation of proce-
dures that guarantee a quick access to the community budget30 and to the creation 
of a fund made of contributions from the States31 to finance preparatory activities 
of missions that cannot be included in the Union budget (Article 41, nº3 of the 
TEU).
The dynamism of the young CSDP can be interpreted as “a greater willingness by 
the Member States to develop a ‘military arm’ of the EU” (Daghan, 2008, p. 4). 
However, it should be noted that its development will take place in the (controlled) 
framework of intergovernmental cooperation and that NATO remains the “founda-
tion of collective defence” (of its Member States) and “the appropriate forum to 
fulfil it” (Article 42, nº7 of the TEU). To this, accrues the known limitations of 
resources, as well as the confirmed tendency for the predominance of civilian mis-
sions, both of which condition the progress of the military component. Finally, the 
enlargement, the diversification of missions and the growing number of mixed 
(civilian/military) missions, will make the need for a coherent comprehensive 
security actor more pressing.
‘Internal Security’
The issues pertaining to ‘internal security’, formerly under the aegis of the third 
pillar, were transferred to the TFEU and moved into title IV, dedicated to the “Area 
30 “The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid 
access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the frame-
work of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for 
the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43. It shall act after consulting the European 
Parliament” (nº3, Article 41 of the TEU).
31 Similar to Athena mechanism.
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of Freedom, Security and Justice” (AFSJ)32, constituting one of eleven areas of 
shared competence.33 
The ‘communitarisation’ of the third pillar is considered one of the most innovative 
transformations of the Treaty34: adoption of regulations, directives and decisions, 
according to the community method (ordinary legislative procedure and by quali-
fied majority, based on proposals from the Commission); control of the implemen-
tation of rules by the Commission and by the Court of Justice; EU representation by 
the Commission in international relations and negotiations. This change can be 
explained by the compensatory effect of the market opening that had already been 
at the origin of the formalisation of JHA cooperation by the Maastricht Treaty, 
which was intensified after 09/11.
Bringing together issues concerning ‘internal security’ and immigration and asy-
lum under the same title (title V of the TFEU), emulating the Maastricht model, this 
time in a community framework, confirms a (negative) securitising movement only 
(formally) interrupted by the Amsterdam Treaty (Brandão, 2007, pp. 57-86). This 
movement is reinforced by the security logic of the external borders, as demon-
strated by two of the objectives set for these policies: “carrying out checks on per-
sons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders”; “the gradual 
introduction of an integrated management system for external borders” (Article 77, 
nº1 of the TFEU)35. 
32 Title V (“Area of freedom, security and justice”) substitutes title VI of the TEC (“Visas, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons”). Besides of chapters on 
“Policies on borders checks, asylum and immigration” (chapter 2) and “Judicial cooperation in 
civil matters” (chapter 3), it also includes chapters 4 (Judicial cooperation in criminal matters”) 
and 5 (Police cooperation).
33 Internal market; social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; economic, social and terri-
torial cohesion; agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological 
resources; environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-European networks; energy; 
area of freedom, security and justice; common safety concerns in public health matters (Article 
4 of the TFEU).
34 “(..) the powers of the Commission under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union shall not be applicable and the powers of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, in the version in force before the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, shall remain the same, including where they have been 
accepted under Article 35(2) of the said Treaty on European Union” (Article 10, Protocol nº36).
35 The Treaty formalises a comprehensive concept of ‘integrated border security system’, defined 
by the JHA Council in December 2006: “Frontex promotes a pan European model of Integrated 
Border Security, which consists not only of border controls but also other important elements. 
The first tier of the model is formed by exchange of information and cooperation between 
Member States, immigration and repatriation. The second tier is represented by border and 
customs control including surveillance, border checks and risk analysis. The third tier is linked 
with cooperation with border guards, customs and police authorities in neighbouring coun-
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Aiming at reinforcing operational cooperation in the ‘internal security’ domain, the 
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) was 
set up within the Council, “in order to ensure that operational cooperation on inter-
nal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union“ (Article 71 of the 
TFEU). This innovation was justified by the need to counter the efficiency and 
transparency deficit of operational cooperation, all the more urgent in the context 
of the anti-terrorist fight. Underlying the initial proposal of the new structure were 
the principle of clear separation between legislative and operational tasks36 and the 
overcoming of the pillarisation of ‘internal security’37. 
In the framework of the previous AFSJ multi-annual programme, one of the prior-
ity tasks of the new organism was the conception, follow-up and implementation 
of a global internal security strategy: “terrorism and organised crime, drug traffick-
ing, corruption, traffic of human beings, people smuggling and arms trafficking, 
among others, keep on threatening the EU’s internal security. The spread of cross-
border criminality has become an urgent challenge demanding a clear and global 
response.” The Internal Security Strategy “should take into account the External 
Security Strategy, due to “the existing inter-relation that exists between internal 
security and the external dimension of threats” (Conselho da União Europeia, 2009, 
p. 36). Having overcome the British resistance, the Lisbon Treaty provided for the 
possibility of establishing a ‘European Public Prosecutor’s Office’ (Article 86 of the 
TFEU) to fight crimes that may jeopardize the Union’s financial interests.
tries. The fourth tier is connected with cooperation with third countries including common 
activities” Frontex (n.d). External border security is historically related with internal market 
(see: Commission of European Communities, 1988. “Completing the Internal Market: an Area 
without Internal Frontiers” (COM (88) 350); “Communication of the Commission to the Coun-
cil on the Abolition of Controls of Persons at Intra-Community Borders” (COM (1988) 640 final, 
1988). The Amesterdam Treaty attributed competences to EC (first pillar) regarding external 
border controls (Article 62 and 66 of the TEC). In 2001, a ‘European Border Police’ proposal was 
presented by Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium, and rejected by UK and other Mem-
ber States. In 2002, the European Commission approved in 2003, the European Commission 
approved the communication “Towards integrated management of the external borders of the 
Member States of the European Union” [COM (2002) 233]. Frontex (Regulamentation (EC) nº 
2004/2007) implemented “the concept of integrated border management”. See also Frontex 
(2009).
36 See Bunyan (2003).
37 “Abolishing the pillars enables all the authorities concerned with ‘internal security’ to be 
covered for the first time, not merely police forces but also those responsible for customs and 
civil protection. The abolition of the pillars in this way will be welcomed by all practitioners 
who stress that cooperation must cover a broader field than merely police aspects in order to 
ensure internal security. The consequences of the 11 September attacks have shown the impor-
tance of mobilising all services and of cooperation between disciplines” (Secretariat of the 
European Convention, 2003).
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Policy Differentiation in Security Matters: Differentiation against Comprehen-
sive Approach?
For the purpose of our analysis, we intend to answer to both questions – “what 
powers are allocated to the central institutions” (Hix, 2007, p. 580) and how deci-
sion-making process works – in the security domain. In spite of the evidence that 
“politics, government, and policy-making now exist in many contexts either out-
side or beyond the classic Weberian state” (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983, quoted by 
Hix, 2007, p. 580) and that the state is no longer the only security actor, the first 
genuinely supranational governance system demonstrates the resilient centrality of 
the Westphalian actor in security matters. 
The EU policy-making system is highly complex, also due to differentiation across 
policy domains. ‘Policy differentiation’ is understood as differentiated degree and 
nature of EU involvement and consequent differentiated policy-making and deci-
sion-making and associated power distribution among EU institutions across 
policy domains38. This is explained by the traditional tension between suprana- 
tionalism and intergovernmentalism, European solidarity and state sovereignty, 
common interest and national interest(s), collective declaration and unilateral 
action. The case of security is relevant since the differentiation is present inside the 
same (broad) policy area (see table 1 and figure 1).
The Maastricht Treaty inserted the security policy area based in a pillarised struc-
ture. Although under “a single institutional framework” which should “ensure 
the consistency and the continuity of the activities” (Article C), the three pillars 
had relevant policy-making differences that affected the role of EU institutions, 
including the European Commission. Those differences were the result of the major 
distinction between community (1st pillar) and intergovernmental (2nd and 3rd 
pillars) decision-making methods and policy instruments. It should be notice that 
this separation between the Community and intergovernmental instruments had 
been a trend since the times of EPC and due to a French insistence (Duke, 2006).
In spite of the changes inserted by the Lisbon Treaty, the resilience of state power in 
security matters is still patent is several elements: special decision-making proce-
dures; (Council/European Council) decisions by unanimity; legislative initiative 
by Member States; emergency breaks; exclusion of legislative acts; no obligation to 
apply decisions/joint actions (through abstention); exclusion of political and/or 
jurisdictional control; implementation of decisions by the Member States. 
Overall, the external security is under the intergovernmental method (special pro-
cedure) and internal security follows the community method (ordinary legislative 
38 Alternative meanings of the concept: differentiation of involvement in EU policies across Mem-
ber States (‘flexible integration’); functional or sectorial differentiation across policies. It is not 
the case for the purpose of this article.
Ana Paula Brandão
 121 Nação e Defesa
procedure) (see table 2). However a more attentive look reveals constructive ambi-
guities in both security components. The blurring of the dichotomy the two deci-
sion-making methods is a general trend as noted by Antonio Missiroli (2011, p. 1): 
“[S]pecially after the entry into force and subsequent implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the traditional distinction (and opposition) between the so-called ‘commu-
nity’ and ‘inter-governmental’ methods in EU policy-making is less and less rele-
vant. Most common policies entail a ‘mix’ between them and different degrees of 
mutual contamination”. 
Regarding the CSDP, the general guidelines defined by the European Council are 
implemented by the Council. This institution also exercises political control over 
CDSP missions. The preparation of decisions involves several actors – ministers, 
diplomats, staff officers and the High Representative. The later also ensures the 
coherence of EU external action, make proposals for the development of the policy 
and implement decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council. The 
decision-making regarding the launching of CSDP’s crisis management operations 
is even more specific considering its casuistic39 nature. The proposal may come 
from the High Representative or Member State40. The Council, supported by its 
specialized bodies, is the decision-maker: consensus on the interest of engaging in 
a mission considering its political, strategic and capability implications (Political 
and Security Committee); approval of the Crisis Management Concept, of the Con-
cept of Operations and of the Operation Plan; decision to take action; approval of 
the legal decision to launch the operation (Council decision [year]/[serial num-
ber]/ CFSP on the launching of a civilian/military mission). 
The centrality of the Council, the unanimity rule (for all CSDP decisions) and the ad 
hoc state participation in the missions, among other features, demonstrate the inter-
governmental nature of cooperation in the realm of security and defence. In spite of 
this, it is possible to find an “emerging pattern begins to look more like intergovern-
mental supranationalism” (Howorth, 2013, p. 449) since “decisions in security and 
defense policy are very often shaped and even made by small groups of relatively 
well-socialized officials in the key committees acting in a mode which is as close to 
supranational as it is to inter-governmental” (Idem, p. 436): the socialization of EU 
bodies’ members and the consensus construct promote a de facto supranational 
move. According with Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard, “the EU has entered 
into a phase of supranational governance in the area of security” through a two-
39 The launching of a CSDP mission does not obey to a rigid procedure. 
40 Political and Security Committee (PSC), the main preparatory and management body for 
CSDP missions; European Union Military Committee (EUMC); Civilian Aspects of Crisis Man-
agement (CIVCOM); Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD); European Union 
Military Staff (EUMS); Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).
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stage process: “(1) cross-border security issues generate greater demand for EU 
legislation, which (2) supranational organisations supply” (Kaunert and Leónard, 
2012, p. 426).
As mentioned before, the Lisbon Treaty ‘communitarised’ the field of ‘internal 
security’. For the first time, the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 87, para-
graph 1, of the TFEU) based in the joint decision of the Council and the European 
Parliament is applied to a security domain, combined with the qualified majority 
voting in the Council. However there is a special procedure (Article 87, paragraph 
3, of the TFEU) for operational police cooperation through which the Council 
decide by unanimous voting after consulting the European Parliament.
In fact, it remains clouds of intergovernmentalism in the communitarisation of inter-
nal security: the right of initiative is not exclusive of the Commission, since a quarter 
of the Member States can put forward a legislative proposal (Article 76 of the TFEU); 
there is an exemption to the judiciary control laid down in Article 276 of the TFEU; 
the unanimous voting in the Council and the consultation procedure are applicable 
to certain matters41; “the strategic orientations of the legislative and operational pro-
gramme” are defined by the European Council (Article 68 of the TFEU); the opt-out 
possibility42 and the ‘emergency brake’ (Article 82, nº3 of the TFEU). 
Beyond those ambiguities and blurring dichotomies, the true is that the two com-
ponents of security follow different decision-making procedures based on a diverse 
distribution of powers among the central institutions. Moreover the respective out-
puts are distinct in terms of its legal nature (see table 3). This differentiation consti-
tutes a puzzlement considering the European ambition of global (in terms of geo-
graphical reach) comprehensive and coherent security actorness. 
Final Remarks
The post-Cold War period demonstrated that the State is not the only referent object 
of security: it is not the only target of threats, nor the sole ‘supplier’ of security. The 
different referent objects face multilevel and multissectorial threats. Conflicts are 
predominantly intra-state and tend to potentiate transnational threats. Therefore, 
the post-Cold War (in)security environment requires a European governance sys-
tem that combines a diversity of actors, policies and tools.
41 Operational police cooperation (Article 87, nº3 of the TFUE), passports, identity cards, resi-
dence permits (Article 77, nº3 of the TFUE), establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(Article 86, nº1 of the TFUE). 
42 See: Protocol (nº21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice; Protocol (nº22) on the position of Denmark. “While the Lisbon 
Treaty, for the vast majority of Member States, has the effect of ‘homogenising’ a communi-
tarised Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the position of the other Member States, is made 
only more anomalous” (Brendan, 2008, p. 1).
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In a Cold War context, the EEC successfully faced the Westphalian challenge of 
inter-state conflict through non-security means and the post-Westphalian institu-
tionalism. The change in the post-Cold War security environment (opportunity) 
favoured the explicitness of the security actorness of the European Union. In the 
post-Cold War, the European Union asserts itself as a comprehensive and multi-
functional security actor. A post-Westphalian actor which distinguishes itself from 
intergovernmental international organizations in terms of its emergence (integra-
tion), evolution (deepening and enlargement) and nature (combines supranational, 
intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational features) and, more spe-
cifically, distances itself from intergovernmental security organizations in three cru-
cial aspects: it is a polity (altough sui generis); it has the competence and the means 
to fight a diversity of threats in the security spectrum; it is not restricted to the 
security domain, being able to use non-security tools to the advantage of that 
domain.
It is perceivable that there is a progressive institutionalisation of the security actor 
whose performance has positive outputs – security community, extension of the 
community to new states, contribution to security and stability in the neighbouring 
areas, intensifying cooperation in the fight against transnational threats: 
“While the role of individual EU Member States remains critical and many states 
exercise considerable freedom of action outside the EU on security matters (…), the 
EU nonetheless remains the aspiration and focus of efforts to meet jointly the tasks of 
security governance that cannot be net alone or only met poorly by any individual 
states. Moreover, the EU serves as an autonomous security actor as well as a clearing 
station for Member State efforts to cope with the array of security challenges" (Kirsh-
ner and Sperling, 2007, p. 20).
The post-post Cold War created the opportunity for the implementation of a com-
prehensive and multidimensional security strategy. The fight against transnational 
terrorism had a relevant impact on the EU security actorness: upgrading of the 
security agenda and expansion of the security rationale in external relations; impor-
tance of transnational threats to security and consequent aware of the potential 
capacity of EU by coordinating and combining means and policies; cross-pillar/
comprehensive security approach; externalization of ‘internal security’ coopera-
tion; internalization of CSDP; EU presence as a security actor.
The Lisbon Treaty, like the preceding ones, derived from a compromise among dif-
ferent perspectives on the European integration process, as well as from the historic 
tension between active solidarity and state sovereignty, which explains the con-
structive ambiguity(ies). The latest revision of the Founding Treaties confirmed the 
tendency towards the actor’s gradualist construction, associated to the prioritiza-
tion of security issues on the European agenda. The Treaty attributed legal status to 
EU, took a ‘small step’ to overcome the pillarisation, transferred cooperation on 
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internal security, the TFEU, introduced amendments in the continued search for the 
Union’s external coherence and proved the dynamism of the policies of the previ-
ous second and third pillars. These changes constitute ‘little big’ steps that facilitate 
the European Union’s comprehensive action in the security realm. However, the 
intergovernmental idiosyncrasies (unanimous Council decisions, emergency 
brakes, opt-outs, among others) remain in place and put the actor’s efficiency at 
stake. 
The European actor reproduced the Westphalian model based on the separation 
between the internal and external security dimensions, formalized through the pil-
lar structure. The growing complexity of the security challenges called for inter-
pillarisation in the 1990s and cross-pillarisation in the post-post-Cold War. These 
developments reasserted the European Union as a comprehensive and multi-func-
tional security actor and, consequently, they intensified the coherence imperative. 
The issue of coherence initially arised associated to the Union’s international actor-
ness. In spite of the de facto cross-pillarisation in the realm of security and the asser-
tion, recurrent in official documents, of the nexus between the external and the 
internal security components, the theme of the coherence of the security actorness 
is not explicitly conveyed in the Treaty. The ‘end’ of the pillars may in fact enhance 
the inter-policies coordination, but the hidden pillarisation combined with the sui 
generis communitarisation of (EU) internal security may contribute towards the dif-
ferentiated progress concerning CFSP/CSDP to the detriment of the security actor’s 
coherence. Thus, the bridge linking the external and internal dimensions of security 
has yet to be built. 
The states and (security) IGO’s demonstrated their limitations/lack of adaptation 
to the security challenges of the post-Cold War, namely the transboundary security 
problems, so the Union presents itself, also in this area, as a laboratory – a labora-
tory of the post-Westphalian security actorness and of the security governance in 
complex environments. The European narrative assumes a comprehensive 
approach that includes the internal-external security nexus, to deal with those secu-
rity problems. This contrasts with policy differentiation between the two compo-
nents of security, the ‘Gordian Knot’ of security governance – an ambitious action43; 
and an intractable problem44 – that undermines the actor’s coherence, consistency, 
efficiency and visibility. 
 
43 The ‘Gordian Knot’ Operation was the major, most expensive and most controversial Portu-
guese military operation during the colonial war.
44 “Turn him to any cause of policy,/The Gordian Knot of it he will unloose,/Familiar as his gar-
ter” (Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 1 Scene 1. 45-47).
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Appendix
Table 1 – Actor’s Powers in the Security Domain
Actors
Security 
Domain
Powers
States
External –  to put into effect the CFSP
Internal –  legislative initiative (1/4 of the Member States)
EU  
Institutions
EurC
External
–  to identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the objec-
tives of and define general guidelines for the CFSP/CSDP
–  to define and implement the CFSP
–  [EC President] external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its CFSP 
Internal
–  to define the strategic guidelines for legislative and opera-
tional planning
CEU
External
–  to frame the CFSP and take the decisions necessary for defin-
ing and implementing it 
–  [High Representative] to put into effect the CFSP 
–  [High Representative] to submit to the Council proposals to 
the development of CFSP/CSDP carried out as mandated by 
the Council
Internal –  adoption of legislative acts
Com
External
–  to propose policy developments
–  to ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of 
such tasks (acting under the authority of the Council and in 
close contact with the Political and Security Committee)
Internal
–  legislative initiative
–  political control
EP
External
–  to ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it 
and to the High Representative
–  to be regularly consulted by the High Representative 
–  to debate on progress in implementing the policy (twice a year)
Internal
–  adoption (with the Council) of legislative acts (except opera-
tional cooperation)
–  political control
–  to accept/reject international agreements (consent procedure)
EUCJ
External
–  no jurisdiction with the exception of monitoring compliance 
with Article 40 of this Treaty and reviewing the legality of cer-
tain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of 
Article 275 of the TFEU
Internal
–  jurisdictional control (except operational cooperation – Article 
276)
Legend: CSDP=Common Security and Defence Policy; CEU= Council of the European Union; 
CFSP=Common Foreign and Security Policy; EC= European Council; ECom= European Commission; 
EP=European Parliament; ES= External Security; EUCJ= European Union Court of Justice; IS=Internal 
Security; TEU=Treaty on the European Union; TFEU=Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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Figure 1 – Policy Cycle(s): External and Internal Security
 External Security  Internal Security
Table 2 – Decision-making in the Security Domain
External Security Internal Security
Intergovernmental method
Specific rules and procedures
–  Proposals: High Representative; Coun-
cil; Member States
–  Adoption: European Council; Council
–  Unanimity – decisions by the European 
Council and the Council 
–  Constructive unanimity – abstention by 
a Member State (although it will not be 
obliged to apply the decision, it will 
accept that the decision commits the 
Union and will refrain from any action 
likely to conflict with or impede Union 
action based on that decision)
–  Qualified majority – decisions by the 
Council when defining a Union action or 
position on the basis of a decision or a 
specific request of the European Council.
(sui generis) Community method
Ordinary legislative procedure
–  Proposals: European Commission; 1/4 
Member States
–  Adoption: Council and European Parlia-
ment
Special legislative procedure [operational 
cooperation]
–  Adoption: Council after consulting the 
European Parliament
–  Qualified majority
–  Unanimity in certain matters 
 
Implementation
Member States 
Council
High- 
Representative
Agenda-setting
European Council
Council
High Representat
Member States
Decision-making
European Council
Council
Implementation
Council (COSI)
EU specialized 
agencies
Member States
Agenda-setting
European Council
European 
Commission
Member States
Decision-making
Council – European 
Paliament
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Table 3 – Outputs of the Security Domain
External Security Internal Security
[no legislative acts]
–  European Council – decisions (related to 
Union’s strategic interests and objectives 
concerned with relations with a coun-
try/region or a theme)
–  Council – decisions (common position or 
joint action)
[legislative acts]
–  regulations
–  directives
–  decisions
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